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.A R:tmphlet entitled "The Degradation

of our
Representative System and its Reform,"
having bten di&tril11ted by a limited. circulation, the fol-

lo1cing additional pages are offered to its reade1·s, to
tdwm, it is hoped, they will not appear superfluous.

A P P EN D I X.
SINCE

the preceding pages were printed, it bas been sug-

gested by several friends, that the plan proposed in them so
entirely revolutionizes our accepted mode of popular elections,
that it will no_t be generally understood without a more distinct and detailed explanation; and although this renders
necessary a repetition of many particulars, the advice is accepted by the author, who hopes to supply in the following
appendix, all that may be desired by those who are sufficiently
interested in his pamphlet to wish to read anything more on
the subject.
Three topics before discussed are recalled as preliminaries.

1. The Qualification of Voters. Whatever may be the provisions fo1· this object, it is only necessary that it should be
such as to render probable the respectability of the voter,
and his interest in upholding the institutions of his country.
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2. Tlie Secret Vote or Ballot must be abandoned.
reasons for this have been previously given.

The

3. Tlie Division of States into Districts for election to the
Presidential or legislative offices, must also be abandoned;
the least reflection showing that it is·not land, nor the owners
of it, who form our constituencies, but the citizens generally;
and that the opinions, principles, and interests of the people,
which ought really to find expression in their representatives,
can never be expected to conform to any possible territoria,J
division.
These questions being put aside, the framework and machinery of the new electoral system ·will be presented as briefly
as possible.
I . 1n tlie first place, a Registrar-General must be appointed
in every State, with as many deputies in the different counties as may be necessary, with general and local offices of
record.
II. The duty of the Registrars should be to prepare a list
of all the qualified voters in the State, dividing them according to the residences in townships or wards, and arranging
their names alphabetically. This should be a permanent record, of ea-sy reference at the local and general registry
offices.
III. Six months before each general election, there should
be a publication of all the qualified voters on record; the lists
being printed in the local newspapers, and exposed in various
public places in every township or ward.
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IV. After the publication, two or three months should be
given for additions or corrections, to be decided upon by the
R egistrar; after which time no appeal should be heard, and
the lists closed. The names of the additional voters, if any,
should be published as above.
V. The Registrar's books being closed, and the whole
number of qualified voters being ascertained, the numerical
constituency of each member of the National or State Legislature may be determined, by using as a divisor the number of
places to be filled. But it is not necessary to count the
whole number of qualified voters ; the largest number of votes
ever given in any previous election, with a proportional addition for the estimated increase of population, may be taken
as the aggregate; the quotient produced by the number of
representatives as a divisor, may be accepted as the whole
constituency of each member, to be procured by the candidate
in any part of the S tate.
VI. Immediately after closing the books of registry, a
ticket should be furni~hed from the Registrar's office to every
qualified voter, stating his right to vote for each member of
Congress or State Legislature, or any other elective officer,-a
separate ticket for each office. The ticket might have some
such form as the following :
" J ohn Doe is authorized to vote for member of Congress
( or other office), of which this ticket is his certificate. An
assignment by writing on the back is necessary to convey the
vote to the member of his choice."
Signed by the Registrar.
N . B. This ticket should be numbered and prepared in such
a way as to guard against a counterfeit.
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VII. The ticket thus placed in the hands of an elector, is
not to be used at an ordinary polling-place, but regularly
assigned to the representative before a notary public, or some
similar officer; the number and names being entered on a
record kept for that purpose, and the tickets so assigned are
to be handed to the member elect as his certificates, to be
presented and counted at the proper office of the legislative
body to which he is elected.
VIII. Several days (ten are proposed), should be allowed
.for this assignment, previous to the closing of the election ;
and it might not be found objectionable for the notary to receive the assignment of a vote at the house of an elector in
case of serious .illness.
IX. No more votes would be required for or given to one
,candidate than the number making the complement of his
-constituency. Others which might be offered, could be passed
over by the advice of the member elect, or his committee of
-eanvass, to some other candidate representing similar interests
,or principles.

X. As votes would coalesce in this manner, it is presumed
that the greatest number of places in the legislative body
would be filled by a totality vote. The few seats not receiving
the full complement might be filled by those candidates
whose number of votes exceeds two-thirds of what constitutes
a perfect constituency; and if, in fine, in consequence of the
great number of candidates, there should still be a seat unfilled, a new election might be declared, at which all the voting
tickets not previously effective might be again used.
The most important part of the new scheme of election con-
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sists in the mode of nominating candidates, and it is in this
particular that the great defect of our present system is to be
found.
The immemorial custom of England, so different from our
own, has generally secured for her Parliaments the eleetion of
the most eminent and capable men; for while it must be
admitted that in Great Britain, before the Reform of 1832,
the distribution of the suffrage was singularly' unequal, and
the anomalies of the system so great as to exclude from the
polls a large number of competent and worthy voters, yet
Parliament has always contained and generally been controlled by men of the most distinguished talents and loftiest
patriotism.
The reason is, that in most cases the nomination of members has been in the hands of those best qualified to make it.
The heads of the great industrial interests, or the leaders of·
the great political parties are accustomed to meet, and having
agreed upon and nominated the fittest man to support their
interests, or advocate their principles, conducted the election
by canvassing committees a.ppointed by themselves; and whatever influences might be brought to bear upon the electors,
and however often their votes were given by dictation, it may
be asserted, that except in the cases of the close corporations, and Scotch counties, which were the worst part of the
old system,* the candidate was never suspected of making a

*·ln tlte first, the constituency was vested' in members of a self.
electing body of burgesses or freemen, few in number, and often non-residents, or having little interest or no property in the town or city, where a
large and respectable population was really disfranchised. 111 tlte second,
there was an extremely limited freehold suffrage, generally not a tenth of
the competent voters, anu the inheritors of land had the extraordinary privilege of disposing of their property and retaining the votes attached to it;
so that sometimes, a family long dissociated from their hereditary possessions,
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corrupt bargain to be fulfilled after the election by his influence in procuring offices or emoluments. It is only since
the extension of the suffrage in some of the largest centres of
population, that we hear a complaint of bad nominations,
owing to the combination of untrustworthy or corrupt men,
working like the managing politicians of America. As a consequence, the great metropolitan districts, and others of the
same nature,· have been represented in the National Legislature by men eminent neither for ability nor personal worth.
This will not surprise any one who has closely watched the
system of nominations in America.
Without going further into this subject, which has been here
introduced, not with the view of holding up the English system
to admiration, but merely to prove that the plan for Nomination and Canvassing to be proposed is neither novel nor
untried, and to give a precedent of its successful working;
we may proceed to the details necessary to carry out the
scheme of voting by totalities, partially exposed in the preceding pages.
In the first place, it is proposed, that any number of respectable citizens, recognized as the heads of the great industrial interests, or the leaders of public opinion on any subject,
should meet, and by agreement among ihemselves, nominate
as their candidate for Congress or local Legislature, the
had the control of five or six: votes, enough to turn a disputed election and
purchase any amount of ministerial patronage.
The rotten and nomination boroughs were far less objectionable 7 they often

ensured the representation of great interests in distant parts of the Empire,
which could in no other way have a voice in Parliament; still more frequently, were they the means of introducing young members of great ability,
who had not yet won fame and popularity. They were great anomalies in
the Constitution, but not without their advantages.
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person best fitted, in their opinion, to sustain their interests
or principles.

Secondly. With the announcement of the nomination, it is
underst~od that there should be published an address to their
fellow-citizens, declaring their views and wishes, and describing the character and services of their candidate.
Thirdly. At the same time, the nominators will appoint a
canvassing committee, consisting of any requisite number,
and composed of men of honor, character, and respectability,
,vhose names should also be published.
Fourtlily. They will establish a central office, or headquarters, at which all qualified voters approving the nomination, may be invited to hand in their names.
All this should be done, if possible, immediately after the
first publication of the lists of qualified voters.

Fiftlily. The canvass may then begin; conducted as it is in
England, by printed appeals and addresses at public meetings; but especially, by JPersonal application to the voters,
who might b~ sought in any district of the State, but would
be chiefly looked for among those who are united in interests,
or common political opinions.
Sixthly. A list of those offering their names at the central
office, or promising their support to the members of the committee, being kept, as soon as the number forming the constituency is complete the canvass will be finished; and no
other act would be requisite for the perfection of the election,
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except the assignment of the voting tickets, as previously described, before a notary public.
The only contingency to be provided for, now occurring to
the writer, is the case of vacancy of a seat by death or resignation. To meet this difficulty the following plan is proposed.
I t will be recollected that at the assignment of the voting
tickets before the notary, a list is to be kept of the numbers
and names. The voting tickets should also be preserved by
the officer of the Legislative body to whom they have been
counted out, aa the certificates of election. This renders it
perfectly easy to supply the original holders with fresh tickets
to be used for the new election. Now, although we may suppose great unison of feelings and principles still to exist in a
constituency which has voted unanimously, we cannot expect
that the agreement on a n·ew choice will be so perfect. At
-the new election, two-thirds or even a majority of the votes
might suffice to return a member for the unexpired term ; and
this practically would be attended with no inconvenience, for
the new member would undoubtedly represent the same interests as his predecessor.
This completes the whole scheme for electing to legislative
offices. A plan so entirely untried under Democratic institutions, may in its working develop defects; but at first sight,
it seems to meet and obviate all the objections to the present
system.
Its execution would unquestionably be facilitated by a
diminished constituency ; but the impolicy and unfairness of
excluding any men, or class of men, from an easy acquisition
of the right of suffrage, is frankly admitted by the writer.
He would, therefore, propose an augmentation of the members
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constituting our legislative bodies, which would have the same
effect in facilitating the canvass.
If our National Congress consisted of men nominated and
elected in the manner proposed, there would be no apparent
objection to increasing its number to four hundred members,the advantages being, besides the greater facility of the canvass, a better chance for the representation of the different
interests and opinions existing in the country, a greater number of men of intelligence and worth to be expected in the
legislative council, and a diminished chance of party division
and control. Cabals and their projects would be more likely
to be frustrated and exposed, and many iniquitous measures,
such as are now carried through with a high hand, would not
be attempted. The incalculable advantage of having in our
legislative bodies members really independent, and above corrupt or even honest party influences, must be admitted; and
the increase of the numbers would probably tend to this most
desired end. The six hundred members of the House of Commons are not thought too many in Great Britain ; and the
numerous members of the Legislature of Massachusetts may
well compare in intelligence, dignity, and honesty, with any
smaller body in our country. This completes the whole plan
for electing to legislative offices.
In the preceding treatise, it was proposed that the Presidential electors should be nominated in the same manner, and
the canvass conducted on the same principles; and although
it may be admitted that a fitter body of men could not be
found to make the choice of our chief magistrate than those
who might be elected in this manner; yet it must be recollected
that the principles moving a citizen in his choice of the President are not the same, and there appears something incongruous in giving the choice to the representatives of partial
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interests or of circumscribed opinions; and a canvassing committee for a Presidential elector would hardly address themselves to the same interests or feelings.
If this objection be thought important, we might return for
the choice of ~resident to the system of separate district
elections; when, if a majority of two-thirds were required in
each district, we would approacli a perfect expression of the
National preference, which never c;tn be obtained with the
general ticket.
But there is another plan to be considered, still better
calculated to give to local minorities their proper weight,
which in the choice of the President, is one of the greatest
objects sought for in the reform of our electoral system.
In South Carolina, and perhaps some other States, the
choice of the Presidential electors has been conferred on the
local Legislature; and such a duty might safely be trusted to
a State Legislature, provided the members have been elected
on the principle of totality 1·epresentation, and were debarred
from giving a majority vote, and thereby reviving in another
form the general ticket, which should in no plan, and in no
shape be tolerated. The mode proposed is very different.
Let the members of both houses of the Legislature be divided by the number of Presidential electors to which the
State is entitled, and the quotient might represent the number
of members to whom might be committed the choice of one
Presidential elector, the members combining according to their
affinities for that purpose. Thus, supposing the number of
Presidential electors allotted to any State were thirty, the
number of the State Senate :fifty, that of the Lower House
one hundred. If we divide the united number one hundred
and :fifty by thirty, the quotient :five will represent the members of the Legislature having a right to combine and choose
one Presidential elector. It will be perceived that in this
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way there will be an opportunity given to all the different
interests and political opinions, as represented in the Legislature, to combine in parties of five, and choose one elector of
their own principles; and the influence of minorities would in
this ,my be felt as much as if the matter were submitted to
the popula-r vote in any manner which could be contrived.
There is: however, an apparent difficulty in this matter,
arising from the fixed number of our legislative bodies, not
often affording an equal dividend so as to leave no fractions;
but an easy mode of obviating this presents itself, by increasing (for this occasion only), the number of the legislative
electors, if they may be so called, by the aqdition of two or
three members at most, either nominated by the Governor,
or elected by a majority of both houses. The number thus
made up, could be divided as above proposed into equal quotients, and the result would be the choice of Presidential
electors with as much fairness and probability of fitness, as
could be attained or desired.
No further remarks on the subject of the election of our
Presidents need be a<lded, to what has been already written
in the body of this essay.
These pages are presented to the public with little expectation of general approval. If they attract attention, they may
subject the writer to severe criticism; but if the questions he
proposes are honestly discussed, he will be satisfied; and if
any one of his suggestions should be adopted by his countrymen, he will be amply rewarded.
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